Cases, Regulations and Statutes by Achenbach, Robert P., Jr.
Volume 9 | Number 4 Article 2
2-27-1998
Cases, Regulations and Statutes
Robert P. Achenbach Jr.
Agricultural Law Press, robert@agrilawpress.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achenbach, Robert P. Jr. (1998) "Cases, Regulations and Statutes," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 9 : No. 4 , Article 2.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol9/iss4/2
26                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
with the provision also applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The common law tort of product disparagement
generally required the plaintiff to prove that (1) the
statement was communicated or published to a third
person, (2) the statement played a material and substantial
part in inducing others not to deal with the plaintiff, (3)
the statement was false and (4) the defendant acted with
wrongful intent or malice.23  Some courts have adopted the
Second Restatement of Torts analysis which requires that
the plaintiff establish that publication of the statement
would cause harm, that the harm was intended or that the
defendant knew the statement was false but published the
statement in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
Some commentators argue that food disparagement
legislation should be viewed as dealing with a matter of
great public interest and concern and that the statutes
should be assessed on the basis of defamation
jurisprudence24 with the probable requirement that
plaintiffs must prove a statement’s falsity.  A number of
the state statutes have seemingly ignored this
requirement.25  That raises troubling constitutional issues
in those states.  The Texas statute, by requiring that the
alleged disparager “knows” the information is false,26 is
less affected by that infirmity.
Further litigation will be necessary for the
constitutional standing of the various statutes to be
ascertained.
From a broader policy perspective, a good argument
can be made that society is best served by rules which
allow open, robust debate on matters of great public
interest and concern.  Food safety clearly falls into that
category.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. The debtor was a
producer of soybean seed and had contracted with a
dealer to produce soybean seed from foundation seed
owned by the dealer. The debtor also contracted with
several growers to grow the seed. The debtor was to
receive a premium on each bushel of seed delivered to
the dealer and paid a premium to the growers out of the
premium received from the dealer. The debtor lost its
state grain license and its business was operated under
the state Department of Agriculture for the purpose of
winding up the debtor's affairs. Although most of the
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contract had been performed by the time the debtor filed
for bankruptcy, several payments were made within 90
days prior to the filing. The payments were made to the
state Department of Agriculture and were not part of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate. The trustee sought to recover
those payments as either fraudulent or preferential. The
trustee alleged that the seed contract with the dealer was
void because it was not written as required by Ill. Cod.
Stat. ch. 505, § 105/1. The court held that the statute did
not provide that an unwritten contract was void but only
provided penalties for failing to put a seed contract in
writing. The court also noted that the contract was also
enforceable because both parties had made substantial
performance in accordance with the oral contract. The
trustee also argued that the payments were preferential.
The court held that the payments were made in the
ordinary course of business as part of the contract.
Barber v. Golden Seed Co., Inc., 129 F.3d 382 (7th
Cir. 1997), aff’g unrep. D.C. op. aff’g sub nom., In re
Ostrom-Martin, Inc., 191 B.R. 126 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1996).
CONSOLIDATION . The debtor was a family
owned farm corporation. Several family members were
also shareholders in another family-owned farm
corporation which leased land and equipment from the
debtor. The corporations shared some property and
commingled assets. A judgment creditor of the debtor
corporation alleged that the nondebtor corporation was
an alter ego of the debtor and the debtor’s assets were
transferred to the nondebtor corporation in order to
remove assets from the bankruptcy estate. The creditor
sought to join the nondebtor corporation in the
bankruptcy case, either under the alter ego doctrine or
substantive consolidation. The court held that the alter
ego doctrine was not available in bankruptcy and that
state law was not applicable to make a nondebtor a
debtor in federal bankruptcy. The court discussed the
judge-made law of substantive consolidation, noting that
no statutory authority existed for the doctrine except the
equitable powers of the bankruptcy court. The doctrine
required the showing of two elements: (1) the creditors
dealt with both entities as a single unit and did not rely
on their separateness and (2) the creditors would be
benefited by the consolidation. The court found that the
creditor failed to provide any information about the other
creditors in the case; therefore, both elements of
substantive consolidationwere lacking in this case. In
addition, the court noted that the creditor would not be
benefited because the creditor was substantially
oversecured. In re Circle Land & Cattle Corp., 213
B.R. 870 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1997).
EXEMPTIONS
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT. The debtors
filed for Chapter 7 in March 1997. On their schedules,
the debtors listed an earned income tax credit refund as
exempt. The trustee objected to the exemption as not
allowed by statute. The court held that the credit was
allowed under Okla. tit. 31, § 1.1, the “undue hardship”
exemption for personal wages. The court held that the
credit was a supplement to other wages earned by the
debtors because the credit was not obtainable unless the
debtors had some income. In re Barnett, 214 B.R. 632
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1997).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The IRS had filed secured
and unsecured claims for pre-petition taxes. The debtor’s
confirmed Chapter 13 plan provided for full payment of
all secured claims and 15 percent payment of all
unsecured claims. The debtor was current on all plan
payments. The debtor filed a current income tax return
which claimed a refund. The IRS sought to offset the
refund against the bankruptcy claims. The court held that
the offset was not allowed because the confirmation of
the plan established the method of payment of all claims.
However, on its own initiative, the court stated that the
refund would not be payable to the debtor or the
bankruptcy estate unless it could be demonstrated that
the IRS was adequately protected as to its secured claim.
In re Kirkpatrick, 214 B.R. 314 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1997).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFER. The debtor had
become delinquent in payment of withheld employee
taxes. The debtor and IRS reached an agreement to pay
the delinquent taxes and the IRS filed a lien against the
debtor’s property. The debtor made a couple of pre-
petition payments designated as payments for the
delinquent taxes and a bank debited the debtor’s account
for a loan payment. After an involuntary petition was
filed against the debtor by several judgment creditors,
the bank paid the remainder of a checking account to the
trustee, pending a decision on whether the funds were
subject to the IRS lien as part of the “trust fund” created
by I.R.C. § 7501. The issue was whether the bank
account funds were considered designated as trust fund
property. The court held that, although the debtor paid
some of the past trust fund taxes from the account, other
creditors were also paid from that account, including the
bank; therefore, the bank account was not considered
designated trust fund money and was property of the
bankruptcy estate when the petition was filed. Thus, the
trustee could avoid the tax lien and include the bank
account funds in the bankruptcy estate. In re Ruggeri
Elec. Contracting, Inc., 214 B.R. 481 (E.D. Mich.
1997), aff’g, 199 B.R. 903 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996).
DISCHARGE. The debtor had failed to file or pay
income taxes for 1980-83 and had filed Form W-4 with
excessive exemptions. The debtor sought discharge of
the taxes because of mitigating factors, including (1) the
debtor’s submission to the tax system in 1985, (2) the
debtor’s attempts to pay the taxes, and (3) the filing of
Forms 4589 and 870. The court held that the debtor’s
failure to file and pay income taxes for four years
constituted willful attempt to evade payment of taxes and
the debtor’s subsequent actions had no effect on the
dischargeability of the taxes. In re Myers, 98-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,195 (Bankr. 6th Cir. 1998).
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DISMISSAL. The debtors originally filed a Chapter
7 case but, when the trustee began proceedings to
dismiss the case, the debtors converted the case to
Chapter 13. The IRS filed a claim in both cases and the
court ordered the debtors to file all due income tax
returns in order to provide a basis for determining the
IRS claim. The debtors refused to file the returns,
arguing that the taxes were illegal. The court dismissed
the case for cause because the debtors refused to file the
income tax returns. The court also noted several other
reasons for dismissal, including failure to include all
disposable income in the plan payments and filing
multiple objections to the tax claims after contrary
rulings by the court. In re Cobb, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,192 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS . The
plaintiff was a cooperative which entered into several
hedge-to-arrive or “flex-hedge” contracts with its
members, including the defendant. As in all of these
cases, the increasing price for corn in 1995-96 reduced
the profitability of these contracts to the cooperative. The
plaintiff in this case had also agreed to pay the margin
costs of the contracts. When the cooperative’s lender
became concerned about the increased costs, the
cooperative requested assurance of performance from the
defendant. The court held that this assurance request was
actually a request for modification of the contracts in
order to avoid further costs to the cooperative. The
defendant responded with written assurances of
performance but the cooperative considered the
assurances inadequate and sued for anticipatory breach
of contract. The defendant counter-sued under the same
action. The court held that the contracts were not illegal
under the Commodity Exchange Act. The court also held
that the cooperative was not entitled to demand
assurance of performance from the defendant because it
had no reasonable belief that the defendant would not
perform. The court also held that the real reason for the
demand was the increased costs to the cooperative, a risk
inherent with the contract, and that the demand for
modification of the contract amounted to an anticipatory
breach of the contract by the cooperative. Dr. Neil Harl
will publish an in-depth discussion of this case in the
next issue of the Digest. Farmers Cooperative Elevator
v. Heyes, No. 23493 (Iowa D. Ct. Kossuth County,
Dec. 23, 1997). Subscribers may order a copy of this
case to be sent by mail or fax for $3.00 from the
Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR
97405; (541) 302-1958.
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS. The plaintiff was an
officer in a farm corporation which had borrowed money
from the defendant. The farm corporation defaulted on
its loan and alleged in previous litigation that after
foreclosing on the farm, the defendant had failed to offer
the corporation the chance to repurchase the farm on the
same terms as the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
During protracted litigation, the plaintiff continued to
operate the farm. In spite of the corporation losing all
efforts to regain the farm, the plaintiff sought the right to
repurchase the farm at the foreclosure sale purchase price
by alleging that the defendant had orally agreed to offer
the plaintiff a right of first refusal. The defendant argued
that no contract existed because the plaintiff had given
no consideration for the right of first refusal. The
plaintiff argued that the plaintiff’s efforts in operating the
farm were adequate consideration for the contract right.
The court held that the plaintiff was working entirely for
the corporation; therefore, the efforts were for the
corporation’s benefit and not the defendant’s benefit.
Because the plaintiff provided no services for the
defendant, the contract was unenforceable for lack of
consideration. Allison v. Agribank, FCB, 949 S.W.2d
182 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
H E R B I C I D E . See the following case under
Products Liability infra . Kuiper v. American
Cyanamid, Co., 131 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1997).
 PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT.  The defendant was a bank which provided a line
of credit to a produce buyer. The bank initially advanced
on the line of credit to the buyer 80 percent of each
invoice of purchased commodities. When the
commodities were subsequently sold, the checks were
mailed to a post office box to which only the bank had a
key. The advanced amounts were withdrawn from the
buyer’s account as principal payments. The interest on
the line of credit was paid directly by the buyer. When
the bank became concerned about the buyer’s financial
status, the advance amount was lowered to 70 percent
and the buyer was restricted as to which purchases
amounts would be advanced. Although the buyer began
to default on payments to the plaintiffs, produce sellers,
the buyer never defaulted on the bank loan. The sellers
sought to recover payments made to the bank made after
the bank knew or should have known that the buyer was
in default under PACA. The District Court had granted
summary judgment for the produce sellers, ruling that
the bank had notice of the buyer’s breach of the PACA
trust. The appellate court reversed, holding that several
issues of material fact had not been decided, including
(1) when the bank had notice of the buyer’s default on
produce payments, (2) whether the bank decreased the
line of credit because of knowledge of the buyer’s poor
financial condition which was severe enough to indicate
breach of the PACA trust, (3) whether the bank made a
reasonable investigation of the buyer’s financial status,
and (4) whether the use of the post office box was
peculiar to the buyer because of the buyer’s poor
financial status.  Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d
995 (11th Cir. 1997).
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FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The decedent’s
estate consisted, in part, of a cattle ranch. In order to pay
the state and federal estate taxes, the executor decided to
sell a portion of the land used as a cattle ranch. The
executor continued to raise cattle on the property because
removal of the cattle would allow the land to revert to
swamp and decrease its value. The estate provided
evidence of the sale of another neighboring parcel of
land which had depreciated because cattle were taken off
the land prior to sale. The court allowed the deduction as
an administrative expense for the expense of raising
cattle on the land as a necessary expense of preserving
the estate property.  Estate of Lockett v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1998-50.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The decedent’s
residence, part of a cattle ranch,  had historical
significance and the decedent’s will bequeathed the
property to a trust which gave the trustees the discretion
to have the property maintained as a historical site. The
trustees eventually gave the property to a water district
for preservation. Although the water district was an
organization for which a charitable gift would be
qualified for a charitable deduction, the court held that
the deduction was not allowed because the trustees had
the discretion to fulfill the bequest without transferring
the property to a qualified charitable organization. The
discretion of the trustees made the value of the gift
unascertainable at the death of the decedent, preventing
the deduction. Estate of Lockett v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1998-50.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* The decedent had owned several
thousand acres of timberland which were inherited from
the decedent’s predeceased spouse. The decedent agreed
to allow a relative to manage the timber, including
sharing the proceeds of timber cut by the relative, the
proceeds of turpentine produced by the relative, and
other proceeds from the land. The decedent had
transferred a portion of the land to the relative for $10
consideration and “love and affection.” The decedent had
given the relative other gifts over the years. The relative
consulted with the decedent’s estate attorneys who
concluded that the transfer was a gift and helped the
relative file gift tax returns. The relative now argued that
the transfers were made in compensation for work
performed by the relative for the decedent. The court
held that the transfer was a gift because (1) the decedent
had a history of gifts to the relative, (2) the transfer had
no business purpose, (3) the decedent and relative did not
form a partnership, and (4) the relative signed the gift tax
returns. The value of the one-half interest in the property
was discounted 20 percent for lack of marketability and
another 30 percent (total of 44 percent) for lack of
control. Estate of Williams v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1998-__; Dec. 52568(M).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
AIR TRANSPORTATION EXCISE TAX. The
IRS has issued guidance which supplies a list of “rural
airports” at which the air transportation excise tax
(except the 7.5 percent tax on all flights) is not charged
for flights originating or departing from the airport. Rev.
Proc. 98-18, I.R.B. 1998-__, __.
BUSINESS EXPENSES . The taxpayer had income
in 1992 and 1993 from disability insurance proceeds.
The taxpayer’s spouse was the sole shareholder of a
corporation. The taxpayer filed an income tax return for
1993 under the married, filing separately status and
claimed deductions for business expenses related to the
corporation’s business. The court held that the taxpayer
was not allowed the deductions because the taxpayer
provided no evidence of payment of the expenses. In
addition, the court held that the deductions were not
allowed because the expenses were related to the
corporation’s business and not to the taxpayer’s trade or
business. Phillips v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-56.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer was a
limited partnership with a LLC and a general partnership
as partners. The taxpayer owned one property which was
leased to a commercial tenant. The property was security
for the taxpayer’s indebtedness. The taxpayer sought to
exchange the property for several other properties, also
subject to indebtedness. The properties involved were
exchanged through a qualified intermediary. The new
properties would be acquired by new entities formed by
the taxpayer, one entity for each new property, with the
taxpayer as the sole owner of each entity. Each new
entity would file an election under Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-3 to be disregarded as an entity separate from
its owner. The new properties would be held by the new
entities as either part of a trade or business or as an
investment. The IRS ruled that the exchange qualified as
a tax-free, like-kind exchange of the original property
and the new properties. Ltr. Rul. 9807013, Nov. 13,
1997.
RETURNS. The taxpayer failed to file returns for
1992, 1993 and 1994, during which time the taxpayer
was married. The IRS assessed a deficiency, interest and
penalty for each tax year based on the tax rate for single
taxpayers. The taxpayer argued that the deficiency
should have been determined using the rate for married
taxpayers since the taxpayer was married during the tax
years involved. The court held that the married taxpayer
rate was available only if the taxpayer filed a joint return
with the taxpayer’s spouse. Because no joint return was
filed, the single taxpayer rate applied. Columbus v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-__; Dec. 52569(M).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 6.03[1].*
ELECTION. The taxpayer was an S corporation with
two equal shareholders. One of the shareholders filed a
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request with the IRS requesting revocation of the S
corporation election. The IRS ruled that the revocation
was insufficient in that shareholders holding more than
50 percent of the ownership interests did not make the
request. Ltr. Rul. 9807007, Nov. 6, 1997.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. The taxpayer was
originally a closely-held C corporation which had
suspended passive activity losses (PALs) for three years.
In the fourth year, the corporation elected S corporation
status and sold several properties which had given rise to
the PALs. Some of the suspended PALs resulted from
depreciation taken on the properties and the corporation
adjusted the bases of the properties by the amount of
suspended PALs, resulting in losses or smaller gains
from the sales. Four years later, the corporation
terminated the S corporation election. The corporation
argued that, under I.R.C. §§ 469(f)(2) and 469(g)(1)(A),
the sale of a property which generated PAL resulted in
offset of the PAL against the gain of the sale. Under
I.R.C. § 469(f)(2), the PAL rules continue to apply when
a closely-held C corporation ceased to be a closely-held
corporation. The IRS argued that I.R.C. § 1371 applied
to prevent any carryover of C corporation PALs to tax
years when the corporation was an S corporation. The
corporation argued that Section 1371 did not apply
because the PAL rules were accounting rules and did not
involve carryovers. The court held that the C corporation
suspended PALs could not be carried forward to the
years the corporation was an S corporation. The court
also held that the C corporation depreciation which
resulted in the PALs could not be added to the bases of
the properties. St. Charles Investment Co. v. Comm’r,
110 T.C. No. 6 (1998).
SECOND CLASS OF STOCK.  The taxpayer was a
family-owned S corporation with one class of stock. The
shareholders executed a stock redemption agreement
which provided for the purchase of one shareholder’s
stock who decided to retire. The price for the shares was
approximately the fair market value of the stock. The
IRS ruled that the redemption agreement did not create a
second class of stock. Ltr. Rul. 9807002, Sept. 30,
1997.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer was an S corporation which
had several trusts as shareholders. When new regulations
were published, the taxpayer realized that one of the
trusts was not a QSST, causing the termination of the S
corporation status. The stock owned by the trust was then
immediately transferred to a person, requalifying the
taxpayer as an S corporation. The IRS ruled that the
termination was inadvertent and waived the termination
of S corporation status. The other trusts (1) had a single
beneficiary, (2) required all distributions be made only to
that beneficiary, (3) required distribution of trust assets
to the beneficiary upon termination of the trust other than
upon the death of the beneficiary, (4) terminated the
trusts at the death of the beneficiary’s grandfather and
granduncle, with discretionary distribution of trust assets
to the beneficiary if the beneficiary is at least 30 years
old, and (6) allowed trustee discretion to distribute
principal at any time for the beneficiary’s education,
support and maintenance. The IRS ruled that the trusts
were QSSTs. Ltr. Rul. 9807003, Sept. 30, 1997.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The IRS has issued
procedures for exceptions from filing an information
return reporting the sale of a residence as real estate.
Under TRA 1997, taxpayers may exclude up to $250,000
($500,000 for married taxpayers) of gain from the sale of
a principal residence under certain conditions. The 1997
legislation also provided for an exception to the real
estate transaction reporting requirements if the seller of
the property provides the “real estate reporting person”
with written assurances that the sale qualified for the
exception. The IRS procedure requires the seller(s) each
to provide, in writing and subject to penalties for perjury,
assurances that each seller (1) owned and used the
residence as the seller’s principal residence for periods
aggregating two years or more during the five years
before the sale; (2) the seller did not sell or exchange
another principal residence during the two years before
the sale; (3) no portion of the residence was used for
business or rental purposes after May 6, 1997; and (4) (a)
the sale or exchange was $250,000 or less, (b) the seller
is married and the sale or exchange was $500,000 or less
and the gain on the sale was $250,000 or less, or (c) the
seller is married, the sale or exchange is $500,000 or
less, and (a) the seller intends to file a joint return for the
year of sale, (b) the seller’s spouse meets the
requirements of (1) and (2) above. The procedure
contains a sample form which may be used by real estate
reporting persons to provide to sellers. Rev. Proc. 98-20,
I.R.B. 1998-7.
NEGLIGENCE
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK. The
plaintiff purchased a farm from one defendant who had
purchased the farm from a second defendant. The second
defendant had installed an underground gasoline storage
tank on the farm. The tank began to leak and the second
defendant removed the gasoline and placed it in an
above-ground storage tank, but did not remove the
underground tank. The current case involved only the
issue of whether the defendants could be held strictly
liable for the ground contamination from the tank. The
court held that strict liability could not be imposed on the
defendants because installation and use of an
underground storage tank was not an abnormally
dangerous activity. Grube v. Daun, 570 N.W.2d 851
(Wis. 1997).
NUISANCE
GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION. The
plaintiffs were crop farmers under whose land ran an
aquifer contaminated with salt from a salt mining and
processing operation owned by the defendant. The
defendant had been the defendant in several prior
nuisance actions involving land upstream from the
plaintiffs’ land. In response to those actions, the Kansas
Department of Water Resources (KDWR) adopted a
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permit process for use of underground water for
irrigation. However, the KDWR enacted a moratorium
on permits involving the aquifer involved in these cases
because the aquifer water was not usable in most areas
and the contamination was spreading downstream. The
plaintiff applied for the permits during the moratorium
but had not obtained a permit for use of aquifer water at
the time this action was brought. The plaintiffs obtained
a jury verdict in nuisance. The defendant argued that the
plaintiffs suffered no injury because they could not use
the water in any case since they did not have a permit to
use the water. The jury had found that the permit
moratorium was an intervening cause for the plaintiffs’
inability to irrigate because the salt contamination
prevented the plaintiffs from obtaining a permit. The
court upheld the jury verdict. Scheufler v. General Host
Corp., 126 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 1997).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
HERBICIDE . The plaintiffs were soybean/corn
farmers who applied to their soybean fields a herbicide,
Scepter, manufactured by the defendant. The herbicide
was registered with the EPA. The seller of the herbicide
represented that the herbicide could be applied to
soybean fields which would be next planted with corn.
The label indicated that the following corn crop could be
planted 11 months after the first application. The
plaintiffs alleged that the herbicide carried over to
damage subsequent corn crops and brought an action in
common- law negl igence  and  f raudulent
misrepresentation. The court held that the fraudulent
misrepresentation claim was barred by the three year
statute of limitations because the alleged damages
occurred in 1987 and the suit was brought in 1993. The
court also held that the negligence claim was pre-empted
by FIFRA because the claim involved information
contained on the label. Kuiper v. American Cyanamid,
Co., 131 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1997).
SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY. The plaintiff was a bank which had
loaned money to the defendant’s child as a dairy
operating loan. The bank had filed a security interest in
all farm products produced by the child’s dairy. The
bank also filed with the Nebraska central filing system to
comply with the federal farm products statute but the
filing did not include milk. The defendant also loaned
money to the child and took an assignment of the
proceeds of milk sold by the dairy. When the dairy
defaulted on its bank loan, the bank sought to recover the
proceeds of milk sales paid to the defendant as
conversion of its security interest in the milk. The
defendant argued that the bank’s failure to include milk
in the federal farm products filing either (1) waived the
security interest in the milk or (2) made the defendant a
buyer in the ordinary course of business who took the
milk without being subject to the bank’s security interest.
The court held that the defendant was not a buyer
because the defendant did not receive the milk; therefore,
the defendant could not invoke the protections of the
federal statute. The court also held that, because the
defendant had not filed any security interest, the bank’s
security interest had priority over the milk proceeds and
could recover the proceeds under an action for
conversion. Battle Creek State Bank v. Preusker, 571
N.W.2d 294 (Neb. 1997).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
LAND USE. The Oregon Land Conservation and
Development Commission (LCDC) promulgated rules
involving prohibited uses of “high value farmland”
located in an area zoned as “exclusive farm use” (EFU)
land. The state statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.213, allowed
some of the prohibited uses on EFU land. The  court held
that the LCDC regulations were allowed under the state
statute because the regulations were more restrictive than
the statute and consistent with the statute’s purpose of
preserving agricultural land. Lane County v. LCDC,
942 P.2d 278 (Or. 1997), rev’g, 914 P.2d 1114 (1996),
aff’g, 910 P.2d 414 (1996).
TRESPASS
TIMBER. The plaintiff owned 10 acres of
timberland which the plaintiff intended to use as a
retirement residence. The land had been owned by the
plaintiff’s family for over 85 years, all without cutting
down any trees. The defendant owned neighboring land
and had removed trees from two acres of the plaintiff’s
land. The jury awarded the plaintiff an amount for the
lost trees more than double the value of the entire 10
acres, plus punitive damages. The damages were tripled
under statute because the trespass was knowing and
willful. The trial judge ordered a new trial because the
total damages were unreasonable in relation to the value
of the land. The appellate court affirmed. The court held
that, although each separate element of the damages was
allowable, the total damages awarded could not be
unreasonable in relation to the value of the land.
Although the court stated that the damage award for the
value of the trees could exceed the value of the land,
such an award is impossible if punitive damages and the
statutory triple damages are also involved, at least for
smaller parcels of land. Allyn v. Boe, 943 P.2d 364
(Wash. Ct. app. 1997).
CITATION UPDATES
Saltzman v. Comm’r, 131 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1997
(valuation) see p. 4 supra.
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PRINCIPLES OF
AGRICULTURAL LAW
by Roger McEowen & Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf textbook is
ideal for instructors, attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who teach agricultural law courses in
law schools or at the junior college or university levels.
The book contains over 900 pages plus an index, table
of cases and glossary. The chapters include discussion of
legal issues, examples, lengthy quotations from cases and
review questions.
Instructors who adopt the text for purchase by students
receive a free copy and all updates. Updates are published
every August and December to keep the Principles current
with the latest developments. Student purchasers are
entitled to one free update, with subsequent updates
available at $30 per year.
If you would like a review a copy or to purchase a
copy of the Principles, please contact: Agricultural Law
Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients.
The book contains over 900 pages and an index. The
Manual is particularly strong in the areas of federal
income and estate taxes, farm bankruptcy, and farm
business planning.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to
keep the Manual current with the latest developments.
After the first free update, additional updates will be billed
at $100 per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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